ABSTRACT:When local bureaucrats in China disagree with their superiors,official channels for achieving a policy revision are limited andgenerally ineffective. However, if the stakes involved are high,they may turn to the power of the masses and draw on public pressure to enhance their negotiating position. In such informal inter-bureaucratic bargaining, local officials might intentionally facilitate popular protest and lead to a situation we call ‘mobilized instability.’ More commonly, they borrow power from ‘consent instability,’ that is, they discreetly leak insider information and instruct their police forces to be exceptionally tolerant. In this article, we use the redistricting case in Changxing county, Zhejiang province as well as other incidents to show how local officials can strategically exploit public pressure, in the mode of ‘consent instability,’ to extract policy concessions. We introduce the concept of ‘mobilized instability’ through an examination of jurisdictional restructuring conflict in Daye county, Hubei province. This analysis suggests that reckless intermediaries might over-mobilize and radicalize the masses, thereby undermining intentions and leading to serious consequences for the public officials. The article concludes that the power of the masses may serve as a credible bargaining chip during informal elite bargaining, but it can also be risky for those who handle it poorly.

KEY WORDS:Local bureaucrats; informal elite bargaining; the masses; mobilized instability; consent instability; backfire

本文作者：邓燕华，南京大学社会学系教授；杨振杰，澳门理工学院人文及社会科学高等学校讲师；马啸，北京大学政府管理学院助理教授，北京大学公共治理研究所研究员。