Abstract：Scholars  consider  deficient  local  accountability  mechanisms  a  key shortcoming  of  China’s response  to environmental  issues.  Through  empirical  analysis  of  the  new  procurator-led public  interest  litigation (PIL)  system,  this  study  examines  whether  – and  to  what extent  – this  shortcoming  can  be  remedied by empowering the juridical institutions. It concludes that thanks to the procuratorates’ political insider status,  relative  autonomy  from local  politics  and  extensive  resources,  procurators  have  generally  found ways  to  maintain a  delicate  balance  between  holding  executive  agencies  environmentally  accountable and managing local governments’ resistance to the PIL system. However, reliance on top-down political support may ultimately hinder the expansion and stability of the procuratorial PIL system.

Keywords: judicialization; procuratorate; public interest litigation; centre–local relations

本文作者：王越端，北京大学政府管理学院助理教授，北京大学公共治理研究所研究员；夏颖，香港大学法学院助理教授。